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tvidence-Based
edicine and Clinical
udgment: An Imaginary Divide
he study by Pereira et al. (1) and the accompanying commentary
y Ben-Yehuda (2) once again bring to the fore some often-raised
rguments against evidence-based medicine. Detractors of
vidence-based medicine tend to imbue “clinical judgment” with
n aura, which barely falls short of the divine, by attributing
ntangible powers to clinicians. This view of clinical judgment is
ore about the clinician than about judgment. In reality, individ-
als, clinicians, or otherwise, are swayed more by anecdotal
xperience (3); as a result, they are more prone to systematic errors
hile making judgments under situations of uncertainty (4).
vidence from clinical trials, if anything, adds objectivity, reduces
ias, and refines a clinician’s ability to make decisions.
In the study by Pereira et al. (1), the participating clinicians
ere not in agreement with the random allocation in more than
alf the patients. As pointed out by the investigators, the different
revalence of 3-vessel disease and the complexity of lesions were
rimarily responsible for this situation. Stated simply, the clini-
ians were (justifiably) reluctant to send patients with complex
esions and 3-vessel disease for angioplasty, because they were
ware of the data that these patients would not have the best results
ith angioplasty. Numbers permitting, subgroup analysis of the
rial would probably bear out these clinicians’ concerns. Therefore,
hat has been somewhat mystically termed “clinical judgment” is
othing but the correct interpretation of available data by discern-
ng cardiologists.
It is important for the scientific community to recognize that
here is in fact no real disconnect between evidence-based medi-
ine and an individual clinician’s judgment. Gone are the days
hen a few towering experts drew on personal experience to make
linical decisions. Good clinical judgment in the present day has
volved into the clinician’s ability to appropriately interpret and
ncorporate available evidence in the day-to-day management of
atients. Of course, some clinicians will be better at this than
thers!
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eply
e appreciate Dr. Karthikeyan’s interest in our study on the
redictive power of clinical judgment in chronic coronary artery
isease (1). We agree with his opinion that there is in fact no real
isconnect between evidence-based medicine and an individual
linician’s judgment and that evidence from clinical trials helps add
bjectivity, reduces bias, and refines a clinician’s ability to make
ecisions.
Clinical judgment, far from a mystical definition, is the result of
complex equation that takes into account objective data from
iochemical tests, imaging studies, and a patient’s history. It also
ses subjective information acquired by the physician over the
ourse of the patient–physician relationship.
We disagree, however, with the view that the different preva-
ence of 3-vessel disease and the complexity of lesions were
rimarily responsible for the nonconcordance between a clinician’s
reatment option and the randomization process. Furthermore,
nlike what Dr. Karthikeyan affirmed, this has not been pointed
ut in our report. In fact, a careful examination of Table 3 from our
tudy (1) would allow the observation that lesion morphology
istribution in patients treated by percutaneous coronary interven-
ion (PCI) was not significantly different between concordant and
iscordant groups, and even the concordant group treated by PCI
ad an almost 50% prevalence of patients with 3-vessel disease.
ngiographic findings were certainly used in the decision process.
owever, it should be emphasized that the angiographic variables
hat were investigated explained a very small percentage of our
odel’s overall variance. This means that clinical judgment either
ses other variables not investigated in our study or it is capable of
eriving information from higher-order interactions using the
ariables available from imaging examinations (i.e., angiographic
ndings) and cardiovascular risk factors that a patient may present.
n fact, it probably uses both and has the capability of integrating
ll this information into a single decision.
No simple statements can be easily made regarding what
linical, demographic, angiographic, or biochemical variables are
eing used (or in what way) by clinicians to make their decision in
his particular scenario. An increased number of patients could
otentially permit statistical power for exploratory subgroup and
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March 6, 2007:1012–3igher-order interaction analysis in the aim of disclosing this
mportant issue.
During the last several years the cardiology community has been
ighly influenced by medical guidelines, randomized clinical trials,
nd “cost-effective” algorithms. All these tools are invaluable for
racticing medicine and in helping the decision-making process.
evertheless, we should not forget that a physician’s judgment is
hat processes and consolidates all this information. Apparently,
n this particular clinical scenario it can still make a difference.
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eply
r. Karthikeyan, in an impassioned response to the study by
ereira et al. (1) and my accompanying editorial (2), which
ighlighted the role of clinical judgment, states that detractors of
vidence-based medicine “imbue ‘clinical judgment’ with an aura,
hich barely falls short of the divine.” The message in the editorial,
s well as in the original report, was not intended to either “detract”
rom the appropriate role of evidence-based medicine garnered
hrough sound scientific research or to claim any magical powers
or clinical judgment. Rather, the main point, supported by the
ndings of the study by Pereira et al. (1), is that the complexity of
he clinical decision process as well as the uniqueness of each
ndividual patient may not always be adequately captured in our
videnced-based criteria.Dr. Karthikeyan rightly points out that some of the reasons the
hysicians chose one treatment over the other were objective
ndings on the angiogram. Yet these physicians were better able to
isk-stratify the patients despite the a priori “equivalence” of the
ndings based on the entry criteria of the trial.
No amount of clinical trial data can ever capture the almost
nfinite variables involved in the complex biology of health and
isease. In addition, the somewhat arbitrary cutoffs employed in
ata analysis add additional limitations. Take as an example the
ndings from the SHOCK (SHould we revascularize Occluded
oronaries for cardiogenic shocK) trial (3) that patients over the
ge of 75 did not benefit from revascularization. Taken to its
bsurd limit, would the thoughtful clinician withhold revascular-
zation from the robust patient who is 76 years old and, conversely,
rescribe it for the frail 74-year-old with co-morbidities?
Few would argue with the statement that evidence-based
edicine has improved clinical care. We should be careful,
owever, to borrow from Dr. Karthikeyan’s own terminology, from
scribing “divine” powers to evidence-based medicine and guide-
ines. The limitations of our knowledge base must be acknowl-
dged, as is the contribution of physician experience and judgment,
articularly in individual patients. We should also use scientific
ethods, as admirably done by Pereira et al. (1), to evaluate
vidence-based medicine itself, and to help improve our clinical
ecision-making process.
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